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Title: AB InBev and SABMiller: Building the first truly global beer company 
This case study describes the attempt from AB InBev to acquire SABMiller all along the 
way, from the initial approaches in 2015 until July 2016. It adresses the issues caused by 
attempting to combine the two largest brewers in the world and the unexpected vote on 
Brexit which forced AB InBev to revise its initial offer.    
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AB InBev and SABMiller: Building the first truly global beer company 
On July 23rd, after more than ten months of negotiations, AB InBev was at a decisive turn on 
its path to acquire its biggest rival SABMiller to create the first truly global beer company. In 
a slowing beer market, this seemed like one of the only way for AB InBev to keep growing. 
The Board of AB InBev was wondering what it should do with the formal offer they submitted 
to SABMiller a few months back. All parties had agreed on a deal back then, however, the 
unexpected outcome of the vote on Brexit made the original offer much less attractive for AB 
InBev’s small shareholders. Some activist shareholders also entered to negotiations pushing for 
a higher cash bid. AB InBev was thinking on how to balance its own interests with those of its 
main shareholder groups. Furthermore, the company was still waiting for the Chinese 
government’s approval for this merger. AB InBev wanted to close this acquisition as soon as 
possible and a meeting of the Board was scheduled in the next few days to try to decide the 
future of this deal. 
SABMiller Background 
SABMiller started when British sailor Frederick Mead purchased the Castle Brewery in 
Johannesburg in 1892. The company was then taken public in 1885 as The South African 
Breweries Limited (SAB) on the London Stock Exchange and was the first industrial 
company to be listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange in 1897. In 1898 the company 
started producing its infamous Castle Lager which was huge success and still is until the day.1  
With the demand for beer lowering, the three largest brewers in South Africa, SAB, Ohlsson's 
Cape Breweries and United Breweries, which controlled about 90% of the market together, 
merged in 1956 under the SAB name.2 All along the 20th century SAB made acquisitions in 
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carbonated drinks, wineries, hotels and pubs mostly in South Africa.   
The post-apartheid era marked the start of the international expansion for SAB. In 1993, it 
acquired majority control in Dreher Breweries, the largest brewer in Hungary for $50 million. 
In 1994, it entered the Chinese market through a joint venture with Hong-Kong based China 
Resources Enterprises Ltd. By 1997 the company was the world's 4th largest brewer and 
began divesting non-core assets.3 The year 1999 was very important for SAB, as it relocated 
its headquarters and primary stock exchange listing from South Africa back to London. There 
were also big changes in management and 300 million pounds were raised to fund further 
international expansion. 4  That year SAB started producing in Russia, acquired another 
brewery in China, two in Poland (Lech and Tyskie, later merged to form Kompania 
Piwowarska S.A.) and most importantly Czech Pilsner Urquell and Radegast, thus making it 
the leader of the central European beer market and the world's third biggest brewer. The 
Pilsner Urquell was especially important as it was the most famous Czech beer and the 
original pilsner style beer first produced in 1842. In the early 2000's the expansion continued 
with acquisitions and joint ventures in India (Narang, Mysore and Rochees Breweries), 
Africa (Castel Group), China (Sichuan Blue Sword) and Central America (Cerverceria 
Hondurena in Honduras and BevCo in El Salvador).  
In 2002 SAB acquired 100% of Miller Brewing from Phillip Morris (who later changed its 
name to Altria) for $5.6 billion thus making it the second largest brewer in the world only 
behind Anheuseur-Busch, and changed its name to SABMiller (See  
Exhibit 2 for world’s largest brewers).5 Phillip Morris became the largest shareholder with 
36% of economic rights and 25% of voting rights, and gained three seats on the board of 
directors.6 The acquisition of Miller, who was the second largest brewer in the US by volume 
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at the time, gave SAB access to the North American market, the largest in the world.7 
SABMiller then moved into Western Europe with the acquisition of Italian brewer Birra 
Peroni in 2003 for $270 million and South America with the acquisitions of Bavaria S.A, 
property of the Santo Domingo Family. SABMiller continued to grow internationally by 
making acquisitions in several developing countries and maintaining its positions as second 
largest brewer in the world.8 Other notable acquisitions include Royal Grolsch in 2008 for 
$1.2 billion and Australia's Foster's Group in 2011 for $12.2 billion, its biggest acquisition 
ever.9  
In 2015 SABMiller celebrated 120 years of brewing beers. The company owned more than 
100 breweries (See Exhibit 3 for SABMiller’s portfolio), 40 bottling plants in 80 countries10 
and had over 70000 employees.11 It produced more than 200 international, national and local 
beers which included some famous brands such as Foster, Pilsner Urquell, Miller Genuine 
Draft, Castle Lager, Peroni or Grolsch. The company was also one of the major bottlers for 
the Coca-Cola Company. SABMiller sold approximately 90% of its beverages in markets in 
which it was the number 1 or 2 beer maker. Its major markets were Africa with 33% of 
revenue and Latin America with 35% of revenue (See Exhibit 4 for SABMiller revenue by 
geography). In 2015 SABMiller reached a 324 million hl output, $16.5 billion in sales and 
$5.7 billion in EBITDA.12 The success of the company was not only due to its aggressive 
acquisition strategy but also to the increase in beer consumption from 22 litres per person in 
1999 to 28 litres in 2009, a 21% increase led by Chinese consumption, which went up by 





AB InBev Background 
AB InBev's history dates back more than 600 years and resulted from a series of mergers. It 
started in 1366 when the Den Hoorn Brewery was founded in Leuven, Belgium, where it is still 
headquartered today. It was then renamed Artois in 1717 after its purchase by the master 
Sebastiaan Artois. In 1987 Interbrew was formed by the merger of Artois and Piedboeuf, 
another Belgian brewery born in 1853 in Jupille, Belgium. In the 20th century the company 
grew through acquisitions all around the world.14  
Ambev (short for Companhia de Bebidas das Américas) was created in 1999 from the merger 
of two brazilian giants Brahma and Antarctica (founded in 1885). At the time, it was the 
world's fifth largest brewers with brands such as Skol, Brahma and Antarctica. In 2003, it 
also acquired initial interest in Quilmes Industrial S.A., Argentina's largest beer maker. In 
2004, Ambev and Interbrew combined under the name InBev.15  
Anheuser Busch dates back to 1860 when Eberhard Anheuser took control of Bavarian 
Brewery in St Louis, USA. In 1876 Adolphus Busch, Eberhard’s son-in-law created the 
famous American lager beer Budweiser. The company was then renamed Anheuser-Busch 
Brewing Association. In July 2008, Anheuser Busch agreed to be acquired by InBev for $52 
billion thus giving birth to the largest brewer in the world AB InBev. 16  This deal was 
orchestrated in part by the Brazilian hedge fund 3G. Soon after the merger, it cut 1400 jobs 
from the American company and brought in InBev’s Brazilian executives.17 Warren Buffet 
was also involved in the deal as his company Berkshire Hathaway was Anheuser-Busch’s 
second largest shareholder.18 
AB InBev then proceeded with the acquisitions in 2012 of Grupo Modelo from Mexico, 
another beer giant and owner of the Corona brand (Mexico's bestselling beer), for $20.1 
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billion.19 AB InBev had a strong presence in the Americas, Europe and Asia. Its portfolio 
included more than 30 brands segmented into global, multi-country and global brands. 16 
brands such as Budweiser, Stella Artois, Beck’s, Modelo Especial, Bud Light, Corona, Skol, 
Brahma, Antarctica, Michelob Lager, Harbin, and Jupiler were worth over $1 billion (See 
Exhibit 3Exhibit 5 for AB InBev’s portfolio and brand segmentation). 20  In 2015, the 
company had about $43 billion in Revenues, $16.8 billion in EBITDA and over 150'000 
employees for an output of 457 million hls.21 AB InBev had operations in 25 countries and 
sales in more than 100.22 The company was also the 5th largest consumer goods company in 
the world by revenues and 2nd by EBITDA (See Exhibit 6 for comparison with other 
consumer good companies).23 The company's CEO was the Brazilian business man Carlos 
Alves Brito. In September 2015 AB InBev made a first private offer to acquire SABMiller.  
 
Shareholders  
The two companies each had two major shareholder groups that played an important role in the 
transaction (See Exhibit 7 for shareholders distribution). AB InBev biggest shareholder was 
3G Capital, a Brazilian private equity firm controlling about 22.7% of the company. 3G Capital 
was founded in 2004 by Carlos Alberto Sicupira, Jorge Paulo Lemann and Marcel Telles and 
was reputed for its aggressive cost-cutting strategies and lay-offs in its acquired companies. 
The company had recently completed a series of megadeals including the acquisition of Burger 
King, the merger of Anheuseur-Busch and InBev and the merger of Kraft and Heinz. Another 
important shareholder group consisted of three Belgian families who, together, held about 
28.6% of the company: The De Spoelbergh family, Artois' owners, the Van Damme family of 
the Piedboeuf brewery and the De Mevius family. On the SABMiller side, the largest 
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shareholder with a 26.6% stake was Altria (previously Philip Morris), owner of famous wine 
and cigarette brands such as Marlboro, Chesterfield, Benson & Hedges and L&M. The other 
big shareholder was the Santo Domingo family from Colombia. The family acquired 13.9% 
stake in the company when they sold Colombia's main brewer, Bavaria to SABMiller in 2005.24 
The Santo Domingo was also an investor in 3G capital.25    
 
The Offer  
Everything started on September 16th 2015 when SABMiller published a press release to inform 
its investors that it had been approached by AB InBev regarding a potential acquisition. The 
statement said that the Board of SABMiller had not received a formal proposal yet but that it 
would consider and respond appropriately to any proposal if it were to happen. According to 
the British legislation, AB InBev had until Wednesday October 14th 2015 at 17h to submit a 
formal proposal.26  
A first proposal was made privately on September 17th to Board of Directors of SABMiller for 
£38 per share in cash with a partial share alternative (PSA). The PSA was the possibility to 
convert shares in SABMiller to about half a share (0.483969) of AB InBev and receive cash as 
well (£2.39 in the first offers). This new class of “Restricted Shares” would rank equally with 
AB InBev shares regarding dividends and voting rights. However, they would not be listed and 
would be subject to a 5-year lock-up period after which they could be converted to ordinary 
AB InBev shares on a 1-for-1 basis. The partial share offer was designed to please SABMiller’s 
two biggest shareholders, Altria and BevCo who together held approximately 41% of the 
SABMiller shares. The PSA was designed essentially to defer the tax hit they would have 
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suffered if their shares had been sold for cash. It also allowed to propose a higher cash offer for 
public shareholders and provide a continuing attractive investment for Altria and BevCo.27  
AB InBev then revised its private proposal on September 22nd and offered £40 per share with 
a PSA. Both proposals were dismissed by SABMiller. Finally, on October 7th AB InBev 
submitted a formal proposal of £42.15 per share in cash with a PSA. This represented a 
premium of 44% to SABMiller’s closing share price of £29.34 on September 14th 2015 (See 
Exhibit 8 for share prices), before the first offer was made. The partial share alternative would 
be available for approximately 41% of the SABMiller shares and would represent a 28% 
premium based on October 6th exchange rate (EUR 1.3515: GBP 1.0000).28 AB InBev urged 
SABMiller to accept this offer arguing that it provided a highly attractive opportunity for them. 
The CEO of AB InBev Carlos Brito stated: “Our proposal creates significant value for 
everybody. How long will it be before shareholders see a value of over £42 in the absence of 
an offer from AB InBev? If shareholders agree that we should be in proper discussions, they 
should voice their views and should not allow the Board of SABMiller to frustrate this process 
and let this opportunity slip away.”29 However, the Board of SABMiller once again rejected 
the offer arguing that it “still very substantially undervalued SABMiller”, despite the presence 
on the Board of Directors of three representatives of Altria who were favorable to the merger. 
The Santo Domingo Family with two board seats voted against the deal.30 AB InBev needed 
BevCo’s support to finance its offer which was dependent on the two largest shareholders 
accepting the PSA, even if it was technically open to all shareholders. SABMiller also put 
forward the highly conditional nature of the proposals including significant regulatory hurdles 
in the US and China which had not been addressed by AB InBev.31 On October 12th, the offer 
was raised once again at £43.5 per share with a PSA, which would have represented a 48% 
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premium on the cash offer and a 33% premium on the PSA. The cash component of the partial 
share alternative was £3.56.32 Behind the scene, negotiations took place between 3G and the 
Santo Domingo Family.33 Finally, on October 13th both companies announced that they had 
reached an agreement in principle on a cash offer at £44 per share (a 50% premium) and a 
partial share alternative for a total price of about $108 billion (See Exhibit 9Exhibit 10 
Exhibit 11 for details about the offer). The cash component of the partial share alternative was 
raised to £3.7788 (a 33% premium) which was probably one of the decisive factors in securing 
the Santo Domingo Family’s approval. The Board of SABMiller declared that it would 
recommend the offer to its shareholders if AB InBev was to obtain the regulatory approval for 
the transaction to go through. AB InBev agreed to pay a $3 billion reverse break fee if the deal 
failed because of regulatory clearance or the approval by AB InBev’s shareholders.34 The 
shares of SABMiller would be acquired by a new company incorporated in Belgium and formed 
for the purpose of the transaction. AB InBev would subsequently merge into the new company 
which would become the holding company for the combined group (See Exhibit 12 for Post 
Completion Corporate Structure). The takeover was formally launched on November 11th when 
AB InBev announced that it had secured a $12 billion spin-off and $75billion in bridge 
financing.35   
 
Synergies 
For more than a decade, rumors had it that AB InBev had been examining the possibility of a 
takeover of SAB Miller. The merger would potentially create a truly global beer giant and one 
of the world's leading consumer goods companies. Given the complementary geographic 
9 
 
footprints and portfolios of the two companies (See Exhibit 13 & Exhibit 14 for geographic 
footprint and distribution of revenues), the combined group would be present on almost all 
markets including some key emerging regions with solid growth prospects such as Africa, Asia, 
Central and South America. SABMiller who earned almost a third of its revenues from Africa 
would give AB InBev a strong presence in the continent which was perceived as critical for 
future growth. The beer volume for Africa was expected to grow at almost 3x the global rate 
(44% vs. 16%) on the 2014-1025 period.36 The combined entity would generate revenues of 
$64 billion and EBITDA of $24 billion (without synergies).37 The group would also benefit 
from a highly complementary distribution network, experience and the best practices of both 
companies.38 This deal looked even more attractive for AB InBev because SABMiller was 
relatively cheap at the time thanks to the recent slow growth in emerging markets where more 
than two third of its profits came from and the weak South African Rand and Colombian peso.39  
The announcement of the merger came at a time were beer consumption had been falling in big 
markets. This collapse was due to demographic changes, emergence of new beverages (wine, 
cider), stricter regulation and economic slowdown. Competitive pressure also intensified with 
the boom of small craft beer brewers.40 In this context, it made sense to try to merge with other 
firms to keep growing, as proved the 2014 attempt of SABMiller to buy Heineken, the world's 
third largest brewer. Furthermore, AB InBev was having difficulties in Brazil and the US, two 
of its key markets.41 Carlos Brito commented about this merger: “We believe this combination 
will generate significant growth opportunities and create enhanced value to the benefit of all 
stakeholders. By pooling our resources, we would build one of the world’s leading consumer 
products companies. […] Our joint portfolio of complementary global and local brands would 
provide more choices for beer drinkers in new and existing markets around the world.".42 The 
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chairman of SABMiller Jan Du Plessis also demonstrated his company’s interest in this merger 
by saying that "SABMiller has an unmatched footprint in fast-growing developing markets, 
underpinned by our portfolio of iconic national and global brands. However, AB InBev's offer 
represents an attractive premium and cash return for our shareholders, and secures earlier 
delivery of our long-term value potential, which is why the Board of SABMiller has 
unanimously recommended AB InBev's offer.”43 
Synergies were expected to come from four main areas: procurement and engineering, brewery 
and distribution efficiency, best practice sharing and corporate HQ and overlapping regional 
HQs. In total, there would be an estimated $1.4 billion pre-tax cost synergies per annum which 
would be phased in over four years after the completion of the merger.44 The synergies would 
equal 9% of SABMiller’s sale which was much lower than previous deal organized by 3G such 
as Modelo (21% of sales) or Anheuser-Busch (18% of sales).45 In addition, there would be 
$1.05 billion of synergies identified by SABMiller earlier when it was trying to get a higher 
price bid. To deliver all of these synergies there would be an estimated one-off cash costs of 
$0.9 billion in the first three years after completion.46 According to company information, the 
profit from operation would be over $17 billion billion USD (See Exhibit 15  Pro forma 
combined adjusted operating profit (billion USD).  
 
Regulators  
Some preconditions for the acceptation of the transaction by SABMiller included the receipt of 
regulatory clearance in many countries where the announcement of the merger had sparked 
antitrust reviews: the EU, US, China, South Africa, Colombia, Ecuador, Australia, India and 
Canada (See Exhibit 16 for the deal timeline). In the US, AB InBev and MillersCoors were the 
11 
 
two largest brewers with 46% and 27% market shares respectively47. AB InBev knew that the 
combined company would have had too much market share and the merger would not have 
been accepted by US antitrust regulators. AB InBev thus started by adopting a proactive 
approach to the problem. On November 11th 2015 it announced an agreement with Molson 
Coors to acquire SABMiller’s interest in Miller’s Coors. With this agreement, AB InBev would 
not own any of SABMiller’s US business (including import brand such as Peroni and Pilsner 
Urquell) and would give up ownership of the Miller brand globally. This transaction was valued 
at $12 billion and was conditional on the completion of the acquisition of SABMiller.48 This 
proposed divesture was eventually accepted by the US Department of Justice, the relevant 
authority, on July 20th 2016. AB InBev also made a commitment not to acquire a distributor 
that would give it more than 10% of its annual volume being distributed through the same 
distributor and not to terminate any wholesalers.49 Deputy assistant attorney general at the 
DoJ’s antitrust division Sonia Pfaffenroth declared: “The two largest U.S. brewers will now 
remain independent competitors after the deal. The settlement also preserves the ability of 
smaller brewers – including brewers of craft and import beers – to compete against ABI by 
protecting their access to important distribution networks. Independent distributors that sell 
ABI’s beer will have the freedom to sell and promote the variety of beers that many Americans 
drink.”50 
In November, AB InBev also started exploring the possibility to spin-off part of SABMiller’s 
European business, namely the Peroni and Grolsch brands, in order to head off regulatory 
concerns on the dominance over Europe’s premium beer market. They later reached an 
agreement to sell Peroni, Grolsch and Meantime to Japan’s Asahi for €2.8 billion.51 European 
regulators (the European Commission) generally get involved when a combined company 
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would get more than 40% of the market. Belgium was the only market in Europe where AB 
InBev crossed this threshold with 53.1% market share (SABMiller’s was 0.2%)52. Later on 
April 29th, it updated its remedy package by offering to also sell the entirety of SABMiller’s 
business in Central and Eastern Europe (Hungary, Romania, Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Poland). On May 24th 2016, with the proposed divestments program, AB InBev finally received 
the approval of the European Commission for the merger.53  
In March AB InBev also entered into an agreement to sell SABMiller’s interest in China 
Resources Snow Breweries to China Resources Beer for $1.6 billion. 54  Chinese antitrust 
authorities’, China’s ministry of commerce, approval was still pending as of July 23rd.  
AB InBev was also able to secure approval of the government in South Africa, where it planned 
to list part of its shares, by agreeing to maintain current jobs for the next five years and by 
investing R1 billion to support various programs (support of small-holder farmers, local 
production and alcohol prevention).55 The Competition Commission of South Africa, after an 
investigation, then made the recommendation to accept the offer to the Competition Tribunal.56 
On June 30th the Competition Tribunal accepted the offer based on the previously agreed 
conditions.57  
Meanwhile in Latin America the companies were also engineering an asset swap deal in which 
SABMiller’s Panamanian business would be transferred to Ambev in exchange for AB InBev’s 
units in Colombia, Peru and Ecuador. This would allow AB InBev to focus on countries where 
SABMiller had a well-established business and allow it to initiate operations in Central 
America.58  
Problems arose when EU antitrust regulators ordered an investigation on June 30th on whether 
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AB InBev had abused its dominant position in Belgium by hindering cheaper imports of its 
beer from neighboring countries which is against European antitrust regulation. If it were found 
to be guilty AB InBev could be fined or at least forced to change its practices.59  
 
Financing the Deal 
On November 11th AB InBev announced the details about the financing of the deal. The $104 
billion deal would be financed with a $75 billion syndicated loan which represented the largest 
commercial loan in history.60 AB InBev organized the loan itself with a treasury team that was 
in charge of assembling the group of relationship banks. Self-arranging the loan is very unusual 
for a multibillion acquisition but allowed AB InBev to lower its borrowing costs by reducing 
the fees to the lenders.61 The loan was primarily syndicated in London and New York. The 
syndicate included 21 banks among which AB InBev’s main banks: Banco Santander, Bank of 
America Merrill Lynch, Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, Barclays, BNP Paribas and Deutsche 
bank.62  
The loan was divided in 5 tranches (See Exhibit 17 for Financing Overview): 3-year term $25 
billion loan with a 1-year extension option, 5-year term $10 billion loan, $10 billion one year 
disposals bridge facility, $15 billion 1-year bridge to cash/DCM facility and $15 billion 1-year 
bridge to cash/DCM facility with a 1-year extension option. The weighted average cost of 
funding across the five tranches would be LIBOR + 110bp based on the initial starting margin. 
The net proceeds from the sale of SABMiller’s interests in MillerCoors would be used to repay 
and cancel the Disposals Bridge Facility and in turn the Bridge to Cash/DCM Facility A and B 
if there were any excess. The remaining amount would be repaid by raising money in the debt 
markets. AB InBev also indicated that its target capital structure for the long term remained at 
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a net debt to EBITDA ratio of 2x.63 In September analysts at Standards & Poor’s projected that 
leverage could exceed 4 times in the first year of the combination.64 Other analysts at Wells 
Fargo forecasted that the combined company would be able to reduce debt at a pace of $5 
billion per year.65  
On January 13th 2016, AB InBev started issuing a $46 billion bond, the second largest in 
corporate debt sale history. The issue came in six tranches with maturities of 3, 5, 7, 10, 20 and 
30 years and was being run by BoA Merrill Lynch, Barclays and Deutsche Bank.66 The bond 
also had a special covenant stating that if the acquisition of SABMiller was not completed, AB 
InBev would be required to redeem all the outstanding notes (other than the 20-year and 30-
year maturity notes) at a price of 101% of the principal plus the accrued interests.67 At that 
time, the company had a rating of A-/A-2 and already had a net debt of 2.6 times EBITDA.68 
The issue attracted more than $110 billion in demand and roughly 80% of it was allocated to 
US accounts. The appeal for the issue came not only from AB InBev’s investment grade safety 
in time of uncertainty, but also from the company’s easily understandable business and the 
liquidity that comes with large bond issues.69 AB InBev announced on January 28th that it had 
repaid the $42.5 billion of the loan thanks to the success of this bond. A senior banker said: 
“This is a big relief for banks, which can reuse the capital. It's a successful transaction - we 
made tons of fees on the bonds and the bridges have been paid down which is a great result for 
everyone in a difficult market.”.70 AB InBev paid $725 million in fees to its financing banks 
for this issue. In total, the deal cost the company more than $1.4 billion in fees to investment 
banks, consulting firms, law firms, PR firms and accounting firms.71  
Molson Coors was also backing the acquisition of Miller’s with debt financing from Citigroup, 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch and UBS.72 In the Asahi deal Lazard and Deutsche Bank also 
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advised AB InBev.73  
Brexit and activist investors 
On June 23rd 2016, in a referendum, the British people voted in favor of leaving the European 
Union. The result of the vote surprised pollsters and caused some turmoil on global markets. 
The Prime Minister David Cameron who had campaigned to remain in the EU resigned and 
was replaced by Theresa May. As a result, the British pound crashed 11.1% against the dollar, 
its biggest ever one day fall, and fell to its lowest level against the dollar in 30 years. Markets 
also fell sharply after the announcement (the FTSE 100 fell 8.7%) but quickly recovered unlike 
the pound (See Exhibit 18 for the evolution of the FTSE 100 and the pound).74 The goals of 
cutting immigration and leaving the EU’s single market and customs unions also threw a lot of 
uncertainty on the economy. Dealmakers had warned previously of the chaos that would ensue 
for overseas buyers trying to complete UK acquisitions. According to analysts the SABMiller 
deal had looked pretty safe. Just before the vote the partial share alternative to which Altria and 
BevCo had already committed was valued at £46 per share.75 Theoretically all shareholders 
could choose the partial share alternative but the share issued couldn’t be traded for the next 5 
years which was really unattractive for most fund managers.  
After Brexit Investors started putting pressure for a higher cash bid. The crash in the pound 
coupled with the increase in AB InBev’s share price, increased the value of the partial share 
alternative to about 51 pounds which represented a premium of about 15% over the cash offer.76 
This meant that SABMiller’s two main shareholders were getting a sweeter deal than the other 
investors. Another issue was the fact that British companies selling globally would get a boost 
in their earnings when converting their international sales in the devalued pound. The share of 
SABMiller however didn’t see an increase similar to that of other companies because the £44 
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cash offer caped the possible gains.77 The chairman Du Plessis defended the partial share 
alternative arguing that it had been crucial in securing the approval of the two main shareholders 
of SABMiller Altria and BevCo.78  
The disparity started attracting some of the world’s most powerful activist shareholders such 
as The Children’s Investment Fund (TCI), Davidson Kempner Capital Management and the 
hedge fund Elliott Advisors who started building small stakes.79 Before SABMiller’s annual 
meeting in London, British TCI started building a stake in the company of about 1%. TCI was 
well known for investing in troubled companies like Volkswagen and Safran. London-based 
Elliott Advisors was a privately-owned hedge fund that specialized in investments in companies 
undergoing bankruptcy, reorganization or restructuring. 80  Elliott advisors also sensed an 
opportunity and first took a 1.3% stake in SABMiller before raising it to 1.5% according to 
regulatory filings. Davidson Kempner also owned between 1 and 1.5%.81 Although TCI and 
SABMiller declined to comment on the matter, it was obvious that the investor had an interest 
in the deal and how it unfolded. The underlying assumption was that these activist investors 
would push for a higher cash offer. This was a dangerous strategy as there was no certainty that 
AB InBev would raise its offer. Most shareholders wanted to get the deal done quickly and the 
pound was going back up which played in favor of the existing offer. According to some 
sources close to the deal Aberdeen Asset Management Plc and Legal & General Group Plc 
were also concerned with the deal structure as they owned 2.6% and 1.7% respectively.82 
At the company’s annual general meeting on July 21st Jan Du Plessis announced that the board 
would consider the offer taking into account the drop in the pound following the Brexit vote 
after receiving preconditions from Chinese regulators. He also insisted that he would “make a 
point” of asking AB InBev to issue shares as part of a share swap to allow SABMiller 
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shareholders to have a stake in the combined company.83 Nik Oliver, a UBS analyst, announced 
that AB InBev could increase the cash offer by as much as 15% with limited impact on the 
economics of the deal.84 However, changes in the cash offer would first need to get the approval 
of Altria and BevCo unless the partial share alternative were changed by a proportional or 
greater amount.85 An alternative to raising the cash offer to minority investors could also be to 
decrease the cash component offered to Altria and BevCo or reducing the lock-up period on 
the shares. The current arrangement needed approval by 75% of shareholders but AB InBev 
could also attempt a straight takeover which would only require the majority.86  
 
Decision 
It was now July 23rd. AB InBev’s board was wondering what they should do. Although they 
were likely to get it, there was still uncertainty regarding regulatory approval in China. The EU 
probe into AB InBev dominant position abuse could also complicate the deal later on. Should 
AB InBev keep its offer as it was and risk having the deal not accepted by small shareholders? 
It could raise the cash offer to increase the probability of getting it accepted, however it would 
expose itself to the discontent of its own shareholders. Raising the offer would also signal that 
it was willing to pay more and would expose AB InBev to further bargaining from SABMiller’s 
shareholders. Another option would be to decrease the partial share alternative or reduce the 
lock-up period to make both alternatives fairer. However, this would displease Altria and 
BevCo and therefore would most likely get the deal rejected. Finally, AB InBev could also try 




Teaching Notes  
This case study takes the perspective of the board of AB InBev during a takeover attempt of 
SABMiller. It gives background on both companies and information on the whole M&A 
process until July 2016, just after Brexit. The main task of the case is what to do with the 
offer to acquire SABMiller. The discussion covers different M&A topics such as strategic 
rationales, synergies, value creation, regulation, financing and the EPS accretion fallacy. The 
case also requires students to do a small valuation and to think about the implication of Brexit 
on this deal. Proposed questions and solutions are presented below.  
 
1. What are the strategic rationale behind this merger?  
 
This deal happened in the context of a slowing beer market in developed economies which 
were the main markets of AB InBev (almost 50% of revenues came from developed 
economies). This decline was due to the emergence of new beverages such as wine and cider, 
stricter regulation, economic slowdown and the quick rise of craft beer which intensified 
competitive pressure. AB InBev was experiencing some financial difficulties especially in 
the US and Brazil and in this context, it was difficult to keep growing organically and it made 
sense to try to merge to keep expanding.  
SABMiller on the other hand had most of its revenues coming from emerging market. Due 
to lower beer penetration and lower health concerns and regulations, the beer consumption 
in these countries was still growing at a high rate. Africa which represented 1/3 of 
SABMiller’s revenue was expected to increase its beer consumption at dramatic rate.  
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Although the main rationale was definitely about growth in emerging market, the 
complementary footprint and the subsequent possibility to increase the reach and availability 
of AB InBev’s brand probably played a role. This diversification rationale poses once again 
the question of whether the firms should diversify themselves, and if the potential synergies 
will cover the costs, or if the individual investors should do it. One could also argue that this 
deal was a matter of hubris from 3G who are looking for bigger deals all the time.  
 
 
2. What is the role played by 3G Capital in this deal? What could they strategy 
look like in the future if they successfully conclude this deal? 
 
3G was already responsible for the acquisition of Anheuser-Busch by InBev in 2008 which 
paved the way for the acquisition of SABMiller. For this deal, it was once again 3G who 
initiated and orchestrated the whole process. 3G initiated the negotiations with Altria and got 
them to accept the acquisition. They also successfully convinced the Santo Domingo family, 
who were investors in the hedge fund, to accept the offer. 3G’s proven track record of 
improving margins by cutting costs ensured that some synergies would materialize, at least 
in the short term, and therefore probably played an important role in convincing the 
shareholders of both companies to accept the deal.  
 
Given AB InBev’s potential ultra-dominant position in the market (about 30%) it would be 
impossible for them to acquire other beer companies and they would probably make a move 
for companies in other industries such as CocaCola. This would follow other megadeals such 
as Burger King (2010), Heinz (2013), Tim Horton's (2014) and Kraft (2015). Although 3G 
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does not own these companies entirely it is the most important shareholder in each of them. 
This could be worrisome for regulators as a lot of food and drink products would end up in 
the hands of 3G.  
 
3. Where will the synergies come from? Do you think this merger has the potential 
to generate synergies valuable for AB InBev’s shareholder’s?  
 
According to investors presentation, synergies would come from four main areas: 
procurement and engineering (20%), brewery and distribution efficiency (25%), best practice 
sharing (20%) and corporate HQ and overlapping regional HQs (35%). All these synergies 
would be mostly operational in areas such as sourcing and producing. A lot of them were 
also supposed to come from administrative cuts which seemed consistent with 3G’s strategy 
of firing executives. Additional strategic synergies could also come from the potential 
monopolistic position. By controlling about 1/3 of the beer supplies worldwide, AB InBev 
could also exploit its position and engage in price wars with its competitors for example.  
Like in previous deals, 3G would probably incur in drastic cost reductions and lay-offs that 
were not announced during the M&A process. And like in its previous acquisitions 3G would 
probably get big profits which would be beneficial for all AB InBev shareholders. Given 
3G’s track record, it seemed likely that AB InBev shareholders would get value from this 
acquisition. The question is more to know how much long-term value would actually be 





4. How much are the companies worth on a standalone basis and how much could 
they be worth combined? Is AB InBev overpaying for SABMiller with the 
current offer? Will the AB InBev shareholder receive value? Will the SABMiller 
shareholders receive value?  
 
Since no Pro-Forma information is given on EBITDA and Net Income, it is difficult to use 
multiples to do a valuation of the combined company. We can then use a standard DCF or 
APV valuation to get a ballpark valuation. For details on the valuation and the assumptions, 
see the excel file.  
The valuation for SABMiller are $35 billion (APV), $64 billion (DCF) and $76 billion 
(Ratios) which seems to indicate that it is slightly overpriced. For AB InBev the values range 
from $132 billion (APV) to $190 billion (DCF) and $223 billion (Ratios) which is in line 
with the current market capitalization.  
By using the DCF analysis, we get a combined firm value of $409 billion. By resting the 
current value of the two firms we find that the PV of the synergies equals $154 billion and 
the gain for AB InBev’s shareholders will be $111 billion. With the APV valuation we get a 
PV of the synergies of $112 billion and an gain of $40 billion for AB InBev’s shareholders. 
These values are considerable and are to be taken lightly. This is because the synergies used 
in the valuation are the one disclosed by the companies and are therefore probably 
exaggerated. However, given 3G’s tradition of cost cutting and not announcing them 
beforehand the disclosed synergies probably represent a good proxy for the real ones. 
Furthermore, the acquisition debt will increase the value of the tax shield. The other 
assumptions are relatively conservative and everything seem to indicate that there is an 
important potential gain from this merger for AB InBev’s shareholders. SABMiller 
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shareholders will also definitely receive value thanks to the bi g premiums that AB InBev is 
going to pay. The premium is valued at about $43 billion in the DCF and $72 billion in the 
APV.  
 
5. What were the measures taken by AB InBev to have this deal approved by 
antitrust authorities? What will be the impact of the remedies on the deal?  
 
Executing a merger between the two largest brewers worldwide was very challenging and 
regulators clearance was needed all over the globe. In the whole process, AB InBev acted 
proactively and started by spontaneously proposing “Fix it first” remedies. In Europe, China 
and North America where it would have gotten a too large market share, it spinned off part 
of its business without first entering into negotiations with the antitrust authorities. In the US, 
it then committed to respect some rules regarding distribution. In other countries like South 
Africa, it had to offer behavioral remedies such as investing in development programs and 
promise not to cut any jobs. This system of negotiating spin-offs and remedies before allowed 
them to proceed immediately with the merger once they received all the clearance. For the 
authorities, it ensures that the divesture will take place for sure and that the divested 
companies can be allocated efficiently to maintain competition. However, it also puts more 
pressure on the regulators who have to review all the spin-offs along the main transaction.  
 
6. Discuss the method of payment. How do the financing arrangements contribute 
to value creation and EPS accretion (or dilution)? What are the risks associated 




In this deal, more than 60% of the price will be paid in cash. Stock payment allows the sellers 
to avoid capital gains. Some agency problems can arise when the payment is made with only 
stock or cash. Companies tend to pay only in cash if they believe the target is cheap. They 
pay in stock when the target as perceived as overvalued, when they don’t believe in synergies 
and to hide the fact that they are overpaying (by not having to borrow a lot to finance the 
acquisition). Here the method of payment is pretty balanced and therefore these agency 
problems are less likely to arise.  
In this deal, all the cash component of the acquisition will be financed with debt. AB InBev 
successfully obtained a syndicated loan of $75 billion of which $46 billion were repaid with 
a bond issue. Even if the synergies do not materialize, value will be artificially created 
through the tax shield. EPS accretion will occur if the buyer has a higher P/E ratio at 
acquisitions. The debt financing will create artificial value through the tax shield and 
financial leverage on the EPS. This mechanism can allow negative NPV transaction to 
become EPS accretive. In the case, AB InBev had a lower P/E ratio than SABMiller but 
artificially raised it with the conversion rate in the PSA. This coupled with the tax shield 
would probably prove EPS accretive for AB InBev shareholders. However, evaluating the 
value of an acquisition with EPS accretion is very misleading and risky. Financing an 
acquisition with too much debt will also increase its risk and reduce the financial flexibility 







7. What were the challenges imposed by Brexit? What is the role played by activist 
shareholders?  
 
Brexit caused a lot of uncertainty on the financial markets which made the British pound 
crash. As a result, the value of the PSA jumped but not that of the cash offer. The disparity 
was further increased by the fact that the gains for SABMiller’s shareholders were capped at 
£44 and could not benefit from the potential boost in revenues from international sales that 
other British companies would experience. The total value fell from $106 billion to $100 
billion which a lot of investors felt was not an adequate valuation. The vote thus changed 
completely the logic behind the architecture of the offer. Activist shareholders also sensed 
an opportunity with this change and starting lobbying for a higher cash offer. Their activity 
served to put pressure on the board of AB InBev and served the interests of all smaller 
shareholders.  
 
8. What is your final recommendation to the board of AB InBev regarding their 
offer to acquire SABMiller?  
 
I would recommend increasing the cash offer by a little bit and leave the PSA untouched. I 
think it is necessary to make both offers a bit more even.  
Diminishing the PSA alternative would not be an option as this would probably displease the 
big shareholders and increase the risk that they would not support the acquisition. 
Diminishing the lock-up period on the PSA would also open it to small investors and go 
against the whole logic of the offer. I believe increasing the PSA would not be necessary 
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either, as it already benefited from the drop in the pound. The premium had already increased 
from 43% when the offer was submitted to about 74%.  
Although raising the offer once again would signal it was willing to negotiate, AB InBev 
could probably manage a small increase in the cash offer without increasing the cost of the 
acquisition too much and displeasing its own shareholders. Increasing the cash offer by 1£ 
or 2£ would put the deal value back at its pre-Brexit valuation. This could easily get the 





What really happened?   
 
On July 26, AB InBev submitted a final offer to the board of SABMiller. The final offer was 
raised to £45 in cash, or a Partial Share Alternative comprised of 0.483969 Restricted New 
Shares plus £4.6588 in cash, which represented a premium of 53% and 74% respectively. On 
July 29, China’s ministry of commerce gave its clearance and the board of SABMiller 
unanimously recommended the acquisition to its shareholders. In September shareholders of 
SABMiller overwhelmingly accepted the offer at more than 95% and, in October, the third 
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